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Decentralization and Living Conditions in the EU
Michiel S. de Vries
Abstract:
This paper investigates the effects of decentralization on living 
conditions in core cities in the European Union. It uses data 
from the Urban Audit to investigate whether the level of local 
expenditures relative to central government expenditures 
has an impact on the subjective appreciation of local living 
conditions as measured in the Urban Audit Survey in 75 cities 
as well as the actual quality of local living conditions as 
measured by comparative crime, traffic, urban space and health 
statistics as measured in 560 cities. It investigates the impact 
of decentralization on these living conditions controlling for 
background factors such as population density, median income 
of households and unemployment in the cities.
The analyses show that decentralization does have an added 
value in explaining citizens’ satisfaction with regard to public 
and green space, public transport, health care, reduces actual 
crime and increases feelings of safety.
Introduction
This paper aims to contribute to the discussion of the merits 
of decentralization by presenting a comparative empirical 
analysis of the effects of decentralization on living conditions 
in core cities in the European Union. This is relevant as living 
conditions are of utmost importance for any city’s inhabitants, 
and the impact of decentralization remains a contested subject. 
Whereas almost everyone in the 1950s pleaded in favor of 
centralization, the cons of centralization were emphasized in 
the 1960s.  In the 1990s, decentralization even became a crucial 
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aspect of what was called “good governance.” The supposed 
merits of decentralization are well-known and amply described 
in the literature of that time. After 2000, the supposed merits 
of decentralization are disputed again in conference papers and 
books (see among others De Vries 2000; Treisman 2007). 
The problems faced by decentralization processes and 
decentralized states are also well-known. One major problem 
involves the supposedly lacking capacity of local governments 
in being unable to take full advantage of the tasks and 
responsibilities transferred by the central government in 
decentralization processes or those that are unable to make 
adequate policies to resolve problems in decentralized states. 
This is seen as a major problem, especially in developing 
countries and small municipalities (Cohen & Peterson 1999; 
Griffin 1981; Heller 2001). At the same time, the lacking 
capabilities and capacities are sometimes used as an argument 
in favor for decentralization even if any impact thereof is 
hardly visible. The argument follows that decentralization is 
to be preferred because of this and that or even as an end in 
itself; if it does not deliver on its promises, it is not because 
decentralization is ineffective, but instead, the recommendation 
should be to enhance the capacities and capabilities of municipal 
governments in order to make decentralization work. 
This kind of argumentation seems to make decentralization 
itself a concept above all reproach. Nonetheless, this paper tries 
to investigate whether the assumption underlying this argument 
is valid by turning the argument around. Based on the argument 
one would not only expect the effects of decentralization to 
be absent in poor municipalities lacking basic capacities, but 
one would also expect that decentralization of responsibilities 
and authorities is advantageous for municipalities possessing 
ample capacities and capabilities to take full benefit of such 
decentralization processes and that such municipalities in 
decentralized states have an advantage over similar cities 
in centralized states. This would in an extreme case apply 
especially to large cities in highly developed nation-states. If 
anywhere, the benefits of decentralization should at least be 
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visible in such municipalities having the means, capacity, and 
capability to adequately develop the local policies needed in 
case of decentralization.
The main question addressed in this paper is whether this 
claim can be substantiated and whether the supposed merits 
of decentralization are indeed visible in the extreme case of 
core cities in the European Union. This analysis provides an 
extreme case due to two reasons.
First of all, although there are differences, the capacity of local 
as well as central governments in the EU member-states is 
undisputed; the quality of the EU member-states’ governance is 
ranked among the highest in all kinds of international rankings. 
For instance, in the World Governance Index (see Kauffman 
et al 2006), in indicating their governments provide ample 
civil liberties, political and human rights, there is political 
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of 
law and control of corruption; the EU-member states belong to 
the few countries in the world that have not experienced any 
warfare on its soil during the last decades, which is indicative 
for its political stability; the economic growth within the EU 
has been tremendous resulting in the fact that EU member 
countries belong to the most wealthy and developed countries 
in the world. Important for this research is also that the EU 
consists of sovereign nation-states with varying levels of 
decentralization (Stegarescu 2005). This makes it possible to 
investigate whether variance therein does make any difference.
Secondly, this research involves an extreme case as it looks 
at the effects of decentralization for core cities within the EU, 
which -perhaps contrary to smaller municipalities- may be 
expected to possess even more of the capacity and capabilities 
needed to benefit from decentralization. If a municipal’s 
capacity and capability is sufficient anywhere, it should be at 
least in these core cities.
As will be explained in the methods section, the analyses in this 
research are based on data gathered within the so-called Urban 
Audit (Eurostat 2006, 2008). Both figures on living conditions 
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in 560 core cities and results from surveys conducted in 2006 
about living conditions in 75 of these cities are used in order to 
test whether decentralization does makes a difference for the 
living conditions in these cities.
Of course, we acknowledge that living conditions do not 
only dependent on the powers and authorities given to local 
governments, i.e. decentralization. There are numerous 
background factors determining living conditions. In this paper 
we control the impact of decentralization on living conditions 
for such background factors and investigate whether there is a 
(relevant and significant) added value of decentralization on 
these living conditions. This results in the operational research 
question whether or not decentralization has added value for 
living conditions in major cities. In order to be able to answer 
this question we need to answer the following sub-questions:
1. What might be expected on the basis of previous research 
about the impact of decentralization on living conditions 
at the local level? 
2. What might be expected on the basis of previous research 
about the background factors determining the quality of 
living conditions in municipalities, possibly interacting 
with the impact of decentralization?
3. What are the features of the data used - and what is the 
quality thereof - to test whether these expectations are valid 
for the extreme case of core cities in the well-developed 
countries in the EU?
4. What does an analysis on these data show about the 
impact of the background factors and added value of 
decentralization on local living conditions?
5. What conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the 
analyses?
The next sections will successively address these five questions
Hence, this paper proceeds in the next section with a concise
overview of the literature addressing the expectations found in
previous research on the impact of decentralization.
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Expectations about the impact of decentralization on 
living conditions 
Decentralization has in the past been judged to be either a 
panacea (Kochen & Deutsch 1980, Jun, & Wright 1996, 
Landy 1993; Ingram & Smith 1993; Robinson & White 1998), 
an orthodoxy (Osborne & Gaebler 1992; Fine 2001; Harriss 
2002); as an end in itself (World Bank 1984, 1988, 2000; 
UNDP); as an aspect of good governance(Gilbert 1996; Huther 
and Anwar Shah, Dahal 1996; Huther 2005, Botchway 2001, 
Nanda 2008), but also as a heavily overrated concept with 
ambiguous impacts(Prud’homme 1994, Hadiz 2004; Andrews 
& de Vries 2008) or even a fashion (De Vries 2000; Treisman 
2007, 1). Therefore, decentralization is still a heavily disputed 
concept.
Partly this dispute could be due to the multitude of meanings 
of decentralization. Some scholars define decentralization 
very broadly, including such different phenomena as 
devolution, deconcentration, privatization, delegation and 
even philanthropy (Philips 1982; Cohen & Peterson 1999, 21). 
In order to avoid confusion, decentralization is defined here 
rather narrowly, congruent to what has been called functional 
decentralization, local autonomy, political decentralization as 
well as administrative decentralization, that is, the transfer of 
centrally produced goods and services to local level units of 
government. A decentralized system is defined here as one in 
which decision-making powers, authority, and the management 
of budgets and expenditures are concentrated in the hands 
of local government rather than central government. Hence, 
decentralization is perceived in terms of inter-governmental 
relations which vary to the extent that either the central 
(national) government has the power and authority and takes 
care of the bulk of the public revenues and expenditures or the 
regional and local (sub-national) governments are dominant in 
all these aspects of policy making.
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Partly the different appraisals of decentralization are also 
due to the multitude of supposed but hardly tested merits of 
decentralization. The expected consequences can be found in 
numerous publications, and have been summarized, among 
others, by De Vries (2000) and Treisman (2007). They point to 
expectations about the possibilities to satisfy citizens’ demands, 
the increased honesty, efficiency and responsiveness, better 
performance, increased possibilities for citizen participation, 
improved checks and balances, cooperation and policy stability, 
more policy experimentation and innovation as a consequence 
of decentralization (Treisman 2007, 13-15). Decentralization 
would also increase the possibilities of tailor-made policies, 
to cut through red tape, to increase officials’ knowledge of and 
sensitivity to local problems; it may result in better penetration 
of national policies to remote local communities, greater 
representation for various religious, ethnic and tribal groups in 
the policy process, and greater administrative capability at the 
local level. It can provide a structure in which local projects 
can be coordinated; it may result in a flexible, innovative and 
creative administration meaning it is more effective in its 
implementation due to simplified monitoring and evaluation; 
it can increase political stability and national unity and it 
reduces diseconomies of scale: it is more efficient (De Vries 
2000; see also Rondinelli & Cheema 1983, 14–16). However, 
at the same time both De Vries and Treisman questioned all 
these assumed advantages of decentralization (De Vries 2000, 
199 ff; Treisman 2007, 11-15) resulting in what seems to be 
huge ambiguity about the actual merits of decentralization. De 
Vries concludes that regarding wicked problems too much is 
expected of changing institutional arrangements in practice 
(De Vries 2000, 220). “The tendency to try to solve problems 
only by changing the division of responsibilities and powers, 
without looking at the real causes of such problems or at the 
substantive merits of existing policies, may well be another 
example of a symbolic policy.”  Treisman and De Vries conclude 
that the dissatisfaction with existing arrangements may well 
be causing institutional changes such as decentralization but 
also centralization.  In the conclusion of his well-argued book 
entitled The Architecture of Government, Treisman compares 
decentralization to the fish that jumps out of the frying pan 
into the fire by stating “This fish deserves sympathy rather 
than criticism. The outcomes may be disastrous, but the other 
option is not appealing either” (Treisman 2007, 294).
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One of the problems frequently mentioned in the scholarly 
literature on the subject is that the success of decentralization 
depends on the circumstances (Griffin 1981; Deakin & Walsh 
1996). However, at the same time Von Braun (2003) argued, 
“There is a lack of empirical evidence to analyze the conditions 
and types of rural public goods provision and public spending 
that should be decentralized.” Theoretically the boundary 
conditions are identified. Cohen & Peterson argue that a 
system that promotes accountability is a necessary condition 
(1999, 75). Musgrave points to the need of stabilization and 
high maintenance of employment and output; the achievement 
of high levels of wealth and income, and efficient allocation 
of resources (Musgrave 1959, 181-182). Other scholars 
have pointed to the weak administrative capacity at the local 
level in especially developing countries and criticize the 
decentralization concept for being based on the favorable 
situation in developed countries while applied and promoted 
in the administrative weak developing countries, especially 
problematic in its weak managerial and technical capacity 
(cf. Leonard 1982, 2006). Effective political competition and 
a reasonable level of asset equality and literacy are also seen 
as necessary preconditions for decentralization to achieve 
improved accountability (Dreze and Sen 1989, 107). 
According to Heller (2001) there are three necessary, but not 
sufficient, preconditions for decentralization. The first is a 
high degree of central state capacity. Because any effective 
effort to decentralize requires coordination between levels of 
government and calls for more, not less regulation to guarantee 
basic transparency, accountability and representativity, weak 
states cannot successfully pursue decentralization. Indeed, 
when a weak state devolves power, it is more often than 
not simply making accommodations with local strongmen 
- creating what Mamdani (1996) has labeled decentralized 
despotism - rather than expanding democratic spaces. The 
second requirement is a well-developed civil society. This is 
true not only because it enables the participatory dimension 
of decentralization, but also because it can potentially provide 
new sources of information and feedback, as well as the 
constructive tension that theorists have argued is an essential 
ingredient of democratic governance. The third is a political 
project in which an organized political force - and specifically 
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non-Leninist left of center political parties that have strong 
social movement characteristics - champions decentralization 
(Heller 2001,7-8). Shah (1998) also pointed to the operational 
capacity and constraints. As he argues the answers to some 
key questions will give a better understanding of operational 
capacity, including: 
“Do the agencies with responsibility for various tasks have 
the capacity to undertake them? Do they have the right skills 
mix as well as the incentive to do the right things and to do 
them correctly? Is the bureaucratic culture consistent with the 
attainment of societal objectives? Are there binding contracts 
on public managers for output performance? Does participation 
by civil society help alleviate some of these constraints? To 
what extent can these constraints be overcome by government 
reorganization and reform? Whereas, in industrial countries, 
answers to most of the above questions are expected to be 
in the affirmative, this is not true in the case of a developing 
country” (Shah 1998, 7).
Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) pointed to quality 
of government and public goods provision, including the 
strength of the party system, and the election as opposed to 
the appointment of local- and province-level executives. These 
remarks result in the expectation that decentralization will 
fail to fulfill on its promises when the conditions under which 
decentralization emerges are unfavorable. 
Simultaneously the implication is that the expected merits of 
decentralization will be visible in favorable contexts. This is 
the hypothesis tested in the remainder of this paper by using 
data on core cities in member states of the European Union. In 
these cities the preconditions of ample institutional, managerial, 
and technical capacity in city hall and contextual factors in the 
municipality are largely fulfilled. In these countries and cities 
there is wealth, a very high level of literacy, and certain equity. 
There is political competition, election of local councils, 
accountability, transparency and representativeness. Hence, 
the basic conditions exist under which decentralization could 
flourish. The question is whether or not decentralization deliver 
on its promises under such favorable conditions. 
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Background factors having a possible impact on living 
conditions
The previous section has at least created doubt about the 
effects of decentralization. This doubt also exists concerning 
the research question posed in this paper, namely the impact 
of decentralization on living conditions in core cities in the 
European Union. This is even more so the case as one cannot 
expect that the quality of living conditions are solely dependent 
on decentralization. In the literature on living conditions, many 
other factors are mentioned. For instance, as Sagan et al (2004, 
32) argue, factors frequently studied as determining living 
conditions include working conditions, leisure time activities, 
health indicators, welfare, availability of different leisure 
time options and access to various services. Young (1972, 54) 
added that minority status also takes on major importance. 
The European Information Centre for Nature Conservation 
(1999) suggested to take housing conditions, employment and 
public infrastructures such as cultural and sports into account. 
The task of selecting a particular set of factors to study living 
conditions is far from straightforward given the number of 
determinants (Meyer & Pontheire 2009, 12). 
Explanatory factors determining living conditions are, 
according to Mayer (1993), especially financial and to be 
found in combination with income, expenditures, family size, 
health, and work related expenditures (Mayer 1993; Beverly 
2001). This is indicated below by median disposable household 
income and the unemployment rate. 
Another important explanatory factor seems to be population 
density, i.e. the number of people living in a km2. Research 
shows that this is determinative for the scarcity of green space, 
health, crime, and traffic jams. There is extensive research that 
people perform worse in overcrowded spaces, and there is an 
increase in aggression and discomfort (Rodin 1976, Ostberg et 
al 2006)
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Methods
The data used in this paper are derived from the EU Urban 
Audit project. The goal of this project is to “contribute towards 
the improvement of the quality of urban life: it supports the 
exchange of experience among European cities; it helps to 
identify best practices; it facilitates benchmarking at the 
European level and provides information on the dynamics 
within the cities and with their surroundings” (http://epp.
eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/en/urb_esms.htm). 
Within this project, data on factual features of 560 core cities 
in the EU were collected in four reference periods: 
1989 – 1993, 1994 – 1998, 1999 – 2002 and 2003 – 2006. The 
cities involved are presented in figure 1.
Figure 1. (Source: Urban Audit Methodological handbook, 
Eurostat 2004, 16)
The data were collected by the national statistical offices, by 
the town or city, or from another source. In most cases, data 
have been obtained from censuses, different administrative 
and statistical registers, national and local databases in the 
individual cities and sample basis. In some cases, data have 
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been obtained from a sample survey. Although some variables 
have been estimated, most indicators have been calculated by 
Eurostat (Urban Audit Reference Guide - Data 2003-2004). In 
January 2004, a perception survey parallel to the Urban Audit 
data collection was conducted in 31 cities in the EU-15. In 
random telephone interviews, 300 citizens in each city were 
asked about their perception of various aspects of the quality of 
life in “their” city. In December 2006, the survey was repeated 
with a larger sample of 75 cities in the EU-27, Turkey and 
Croatia (Ibid). In this paper, we use the latter data from 2006.
The factual data comprise information about the population 
in the core cities and larger urban zone (total, age structure, 
density, nationality, fertility, number and structure of 
households, number of houses and features thereof .i.e. living 
area and income levels) and several policy areas (economy, 
income, education, environment, transport, culture and 
recreation, tourism, green space, unemployment, health care, 
crime, as well as municipal expenditures). 
The data used from the perception data in the core cities 
comprise information on satisfaction in several areas. In this 
paper, we use the questions of the survey as given in Table 1.
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This survey was first held in 2004 over 35 cities and repeated 
in 2006 in 75 cities with a number of respondents per city 
between 297 and 308. As Eurostat mentions in its publications, 
the National Urban Audit Coordinators have checked all data 
before they were sent to Eurostat, who executed a project on the 
Quality Check of the Urban Audit between 2004-2005 and in 
2008-2009 to detect potential errors in Urban Audit. Database 
applying systematic control procedures, and to provide 
Eurostat with an updated data set, that has been validated by 
the National Urban Audit Coordinators.
In this research part of the factual data, 250 cities are used 
on average and regarding the perception data based on the 
surveys, the aggregated data over the cities are used, resulting 
in an N of 75. 
The data on decentralization were also derived from Eurostat. 
We use national data on the local expenditures per GDP and 
Central government expenditures per GDP. This results in an 
indicator on decentralization, namely the local expenditures 
divided by the central government expenditures. This variable 
is indicative for the question whether local government is able 
to deal with its problems autonomously.
Analyses
In this section correlation matrices are presented for the relation 
between the level of decentralization and the quality within 
four policy areas, namely public space, crime, public transport 
and health care. In the Urban Audit, there are indicators for 
the actual level of facilities in each of these areas as well as 
the perceived satisfaction of the city’s population. Below it is 
shown how decentralization at the national level is related to 
these four problems, controlling for three background factors, 
namely population density, median disposable income per 
household, and the unemployment rate. We control for these 
three factors, because they are indicative of the basic structure 
of the city and - as was argued above in Section 3 - are known 
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to be determinative for the problems of big cities. The partial 
correlations give the added value of decentralization for 
explaining the level of the problems in the four policy fields. 
We could have presented the results of a regression-analysis, 
but because of the number of missing values on the indicators 
for the actual problems and the limited number of cities in 
which the surveys were conducted (75), a regression-analysis 
is likely to result in unstable parameters. Although this also 
applies to the partial correlations we think that by presenting 
only the partial correlation-matrices we avoid pretending to 
get more out of the data than is justified on methodological 
grounds.
1.1. Green space
The first policy area investigated is that of green space in the 
city. Especially in big cities it increases the well-being of the 
inhabitants if next to houses, apartments and skyscrapers. 
A city also provides green space where its inhabitants can 
recreate, participate in sports, et cetera. As Santos argues, green 
space is needed to incorporate the historical and social nature 
of the way the space is occupied as an inherent component 
in the determinants of living conditions. “Space” becomes 
particularly important in large metropolises, which contain 
elements of diverse origins and ages with a multiplicity of 
capital, work, and cultural relations (quoted in Texeira 2002, 
1193).
The Urban Audit measures the available publicly accessible 
green space per square kilometer. We divided this measurement 
by the total land area of the city. The second variable relevant 
in this respect is the question in the survey whether the 
respondent is satisfied with the green space in the city. Whether 
and how this is related to decentralization is given in Table 
2. Seen in this table is first that contrary to expectations the 
actual green space area is hardly and not significantly related 
to the satisfaction with the amount of green space in the 
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city. However, both indicators are positively and statistically 
significantly associated with the level of decentralization in the 
country in which the city is situated. The larger the part of public 
expenditures by the local level compared to the expenditures at 
the central governments’ level, the more the municipalities in 
the core cities are able to provide accessible green space and to 
satisfy its citizens about such green space. One can conclude 
that in decentralized countries the core cities provide a more 
satisfactory amount of green space for its inhabitants than core 
cities in centralized countries do.
a. Given are PM correlations. An asterix indicates that the 
correlation is statistically significant at 95%
1.2. Public Transport
In large cities adequate public transport is often desperately 
needed to go to work, to go to the city’s facilities and to release 
traffic jams. The Urban Audit points out that the core cities 
in the EU are congested with on average 378 registered cars 
per 1000 inhabitants and an average 25-minute journey time 
to go from home to work fluctuating between 15 minutes and 
71 minutes. In some cities it takes over an hour to go to work. 
One solution for this congestion problem is to expand public 
transport. The degree to which public transport covers the 
whole city is indicated in the Urban Audit by the number of 
stops of public transport per km2. There is hardly any transport 
86
in some cities, while in other cities there are up to 35 stops 
per km2. Whether public transport is better in cities situated in 
countries where decentralization is high is seen in table 3.
Table 3 shows that in decentralized countries inhabitants of core 
cities are more satisfied about public transport, the coverage 
of public transport is higher, and the costs thereof are higher. 
Hence, decentralization seems to have a positive and significant 
effect on the inhabitants’ satisfaction with public transport in 
the city and a positive (although not statistically significant) 
effect on the spread of public transport, although this comes at 
the price of higher cost for monthly tickets in cities situated in 
countries with higher levels of decentralization. From the table 
one can conclude that core cities in decentralized countries have 
better public transport facilities than core cities in centralized 
countries.
1.3. Crime
One of the wicked problems large cities have to deal with is 
crime. Crime is often much more frequent in urban than in 
rural areas, although it even varies among core cities. In the 
Urban Audit, there were on average 3.95 burglaries per 1,000 
inhabitants  reported in cities with a maximum of 23 in Almere, 
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the Netherlands, and Nottingham UK. The number of car thefts 
is somewhat lower – on average 3.45 – with a maximum of 20 
per 1,000 inhabitants in Manchester, UK. Is this variance also 
related to centralization and decentralization?  In many countries 
fierce political discussions are seen among those who plead for 
centralized police and those who favor municipal police. Table 
4 shows the association between the level of decentralization in 
the nation-state and the number of burglaries and car thefts and 
perceptions of safety in the core cities.
Table 4 shows that inhabitants of core cities in decentralized states 
do feel more safe in their neighborhood (R2=.44) and in their 
city (R2=.55) and that the municipality is more able to prevent 
burglaries in these cities (R2= -.19). All these relations are 
statistically significant and as before controlled for population 
density, unemployment and median household income. The 
only problem not significantly related to decentralization is the 
number of car thefts. However, overall one may conclude that 
also regarding crime the impact of decentralization is positive 
on perceptions as well as occurrences.
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1.4. Health care
The last policy area with which decentralization could be 
related to is health care. We investigate the number of available 
hospital beds, the satisfaction among the inhabitants with 
hospitals and doctors, the actual pollution in the city, and the 
perception of pollution. 
Table 5 shows that all indicators but the number of hospital beds 
are related to decentralization as expected. The satisfaction with 
hospitals, doctors, health care in general and air pollution is 
larger in cities situated in decentralized countries and the actual 
air pollution is less. Although not all relations are statistically 
significant, we can conclude that controlling for population 
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density, median household income and unemployment in 
cities, cities in decentralized countries are able to take care of 
health care better than cities in which most public expenditures 
are done by central government.
Hence, the outcomes of the analyses corroborate the claim 
that the degree to which core cities can autonomously decide 
about their policies and how much to spend on social problems 
does have a positive effect on each of the four aspects of the 
living conditions of their inhabitants, i.e. green space, public 
transport, crime and health.
Conclusions
This paper investigated whether the degree of decentralization in 
a nation-state has added explanatory value for four dimensions 
of living conditions in its core cities, i.e. green space, public 
transport, crime and health. Use was made of data from the 
Urban Audit. This is a research project conducted on behalf of 
Eurostat involving 560 cities on which indicators for the actual 
number of health-care facilities, public transport, green space 
and crimes were gathered. The Urban Audit also involves 
surveys among 75 core cities in order to measure whether the 
city’s inhabitants are satisfied with, for instance, the green 
space, public transport, crime and health care. We analyzed 
these data by relating them to the level of decentralization as 
indicated by the expenditures of local government relative 
to those by central government. These associations were 
controlled for population density, median household income 
and unemployment rate in the core cities. 
The analyses in which these data were related to the level 
of decentralization at the national level led to the following 
conclusions: 
1.  As to perceptions, the inhabitants of cities situated in  
 decentralized countries are more satisfied with the   
 facilities with regard to green space, health care, and   
 public transport and feel safer in their neighborhood as  
 well as in the city as a whole.
2.  As to the actual facilities and occurrences, cities in   
 decentralized states have more green space per square  
 kilometer, t better public transport, and experience less  
 crime.
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Overall, the conclusion cannot but be that decentralization 
does have a positive and significant impact on the living 
conditions in core cities in the EU as indicated by its green 
space, public transport, crime and health care. This is a 
significant outcome, because according to us, it is one of the 
first examples of comparative statistical research in which 
the positive effects of decentralization are so clearly visible. 
Although decentralization is one of the most discussed themes 
in public administration, hard evidence of its positive impacts 
were until now only found in theoretical arguments, case 
studies, and rhetoric. 
The findings presented here do not, however, present a final 
answer nor do they provide decentralization with the status of 
a panacea. As also shown some associations are not significant 
such as with the level of car thefts, the number of hospital 
beds, the perceived satisfaction with doctors and pollution. 
Furthermore, as mentioned in the introduction, the cities 
investigated here can be seen as extreme cases, because the 
cities are large municipalities in wealthy countries – EU member 
states - with administrative systems with sufficient capacity 
and capabilities. For instance, in answering the question on the 
Urban Audit survey as to whether administrative services help 
efficiently, on average 63% of each city’s inhabitants (totally) 
agreed, with a maximum of 89% in the administratively 
most capable city. This is unusually high and indicative of 
the relatively high quality of these cities’ administrative 
systems. These cities are therefore able to fully benefit from 
decentralization policies and apparently know how to spend 
the available resources efficiently in such a way that social 
problems diminish, and the satisfaction among its inhabitants 
increases. 
The findings do therefore support the views of adherents to 
decentralization policies. They do have a point which is that 
the largest cities on the wealthiest part of this planet do indeed 
profit from decentralization. 
The remaining question is whether that conclusion can be 
generalized to a statement that municipalities in general profit 
from decentralization. This does not necessarily have to be the 
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case in small municipalities and/or municipalities in relatively 
poor i.e. developing countries. In those cases it could well 
be much more difficult to take advantage of decentralization 
processes. 
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